Statement to the European Parliament Committee on Development and
Sub-Committee on Human Rights

(delivered in abridged form on 2 April 2008 in Brussels)


Madame Chairperson, Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am very grateful for the opportunity to speak to you here today.

My assessment is that the chances are slim for any sort of
'reconciliation' over the near term between the Burma/Myanmar
government and the democracy movement led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
The differences in their basic positions, analysis of the current
situation, and their sense of recent history remains very great. And
I'm doubtful   that  that the Burmese/Myanmar
authorities, despite the best efforts of the UN Secretary-General's
Special Advisor Mr Ibrahim Gambari, are interested in the moment in
pursuing at any sort of
new negotiation with the opposition. I believe the government will
instead move ahead with its own Road Map, as it has stated very
clearly on several recent occasions. I believe that the referendum
will be held in May on the draft constitution, that many opposition
groups will oppose the draft constitution, that this constitution will
nevertheless be adopted and that fresh elections will be held in 2010
leading to a new government, but with the armed forces still the
dominant political institution.

I would urge however that we raise our sights beyond the immediate
politics, and look to see the broader challenges on the horizon,
challenges which in many ways transcend the present political debate.
It is important to remember that Burma/Myanmar is a country of over 50
million people, with a near-majority born since the current political
deadlock began, one of the poorest countries in the world, a country
with pressing humanitarian needs, one only now emerging from nearly
six decades of war and thirty years of self-imposed international
isolation, an incredibly diverse country where the fears and
grievances which have led to inter-ethnic conflict have yet to be
adequately discussed much less addressed. It is also a country not
only with a long history of military government, but where the
military has played a key role in determining the very nature of the
state from its very incipiency in 1948.

What is important to realise is that Burma/Myanmar is at a critical
watershed in its modern history. There are at least four important
transitions underway, transitions which will shape the country for
many years to come:

The first is the generational transition taking place within the armed
forces. Whether we like it or not, the armed forces will continue to
be a dominant if not the dominant institution in Burma/Myanmar for the
foreseeable future. The senior general and deputy senior general as
well as many others in the armed forces top echelon are now well past
retirement age. One way or another, over the next few years a new
leadership in the armed forces will emerge. Who these men are, what
they believe, their hopes and fears, what options they feel they have,
their knowledge and education, how they view the outside world and
their exposure to ideas and experiences outside the country's borders
– the thinking of this rising generation will have a critical impact
long into the country's future.

The second transition is the ending of the civil war. Burma/Myanmar
has experienced multiple armed conflicts continuously since
independence from Great Britain in 1948. These have been conflicts
between successive civilian and military governments and a mix of both
communist and ethnic-minority based insurgencies. Nearly all these
insurgencies have agreed to cease-fires with the government since the
late 1980s. We are now in the final chapter of Burma/Myanmar's sixty
year civil war. How exactly it ends and on whose terms, whether the
so-called cease-fire groups agree in the coming months or years to
voluntarily disarm and demobilize, the effects of this on minority
communities and their perceptions of the central state, the likely
continuation of minority grievances and the possible continuation of
minority efforts to address these grievances by means other than
renewed insurgency, all of this will also determine much of the
country's political landscape for a long time to come.

The third is the economic transition. Burma/Myanmar is moving quickly
from being dependent for its foreign currency on the export of food
and forestry products to becoming a significant exporter of energy.
Natural gas sales to China and perhaps other countries will soon
supplement the more than two billion US dollars a year the government
already receives from gas exports to Thailand. Burma/Myanmar's wealth
in natural gas is substantial with some estimating total gas reserves
at over 50 trillion cubic feet. Burma/Myanmar may also become a major
producer of hydroelectric power in the region and a key supplier of
electricity to both Thailand and China. How this new money is managed
and spent and whether other sectors of the economy will see any
comparable growth will have a tremendous and lasting effect on the
future political economy of the country.

The fourth transition is Burma/Myanmar's rapidly evolving relations
with the rest of the region. The combined population of the country's
five neighbours is over 1.4 billion, more than a fifth of all
humanity. For the first time in the country's history, Burma/Myanmar
has very good relations which each of these neighbours. Two of these
neighbours, India and China, are in the midst of an historic economic
rise with global repercussions. Bilateral co-operation on major
infrastructure projects are now underway. How Burma/Myanmar manages
its relations with these giant neighbours, including on issues of
trade, transport, and emigration will set much of the framework for
the country's politics and economic life for many decades to come.

I have been on record as being opposed to economic sanctions since
1993. I believe that economic sanctions have been ineffective at best
and have most probably been counter-productive in moving the country
towards greater political freedom and democracy. I believe that had
sanctions not been imposed, we would have today a social and economic
landscape much more conducive towards liberal political change. The
sanctions in place are not only the so-called 'targeted sanctions' or
the formal sanctions adopted by the EU and the US in recent years.
They include the cut-off of nearly all bilateral and multilateral
development assistance since 1988, including the cut-off of the
technical assistance I believe is an essential starting point for
serious economic reform.

The net effect of sanctions has been a political economy which
strengthens the political status quo and which has distanced the West
from Burma/Myanmar at a critical moment in its history. Western
leverage on Burma/Myanmar is now close to zero.

Burma/Myanmar's great tragedy is the effective departure from the West
at a time of great change. Long distance condemnation of political
repression and calls for change are no substitute.

I believe it is practically inevitable that Burma/Myanmar will be
quickly integrated into the evolving regional economy. Geographically
situated between India and China, it is impossible for the country to
avoid being caught up in the momentous changes occurring in the
region. Normally this would be a good thing. My fear is that with
Western sanctions in place, the Burmese/Myanmar people will be
integrated into the regional economy as second-class citizens, the
only people not benefiting from access to Western markets, capital and
learning. Burma/Myanmar's integration into the regional economy
whilst under the burden of Western sanctions will do more to shape the
future of ordinary Burmese/Myanmar people than anything to do with the
current referendum and draft constitution.

Finally, I would like to say that at a time when it is very difficult
to what can be done to help the country politically from the outside,
efforts to provide humanitarian assistance for the country's most
vulnerable people should be redoubled. Burma/Myanmar receives less
humanitarian assistance per capita than any of the world's other fifty
poorest countries, and only receives a small fraction per capita of
the assistance provided to Laos, Cambodia, or Vietnam. Hard
statistics on Burma/Myanmar's economy are difficult to come by, but we
know that there are millions, including millions of children, living
in urgent need of international humanitarian assistance. We also know
that despite often draconian restrictions, it is possible to deliver
aid whilst still meeting international humanitarian standards. The
poorest people in Burma/Myanmar have a right to international
humanitarian assistance and should not be penalized for the country's
political stalemate. Working to build up Burma/Myanmar's health and
education systems and ensuring basic food security is a daunting but
not impossible task. These efforts should not be seen as inimical to
any push for democracy. Rather, we should understand that should
health and education standards decline, and ordinary people face
greater impoverishment; no democratic transition will be sustainable.

Thank you.

Thant Myint-U